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Abstract
In his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox (2016, [9]), R.D. Ingthors-
son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on
the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in
time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being
successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of
the B-theory, McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time can also
be used to undermine the B-theory. Ingthorsson argues further that only
by adopting an ontologically frugal presentist metaphysics can one avoid
McTaggart’s paradox and account for identity through time and change.
The aim of this paper is to clarify Russell’s authentic view of time in con-
trast to the B-theory which is McTaggart’s misrepresentation of Russell
and argue that temporal parity it is not a fundamental tenet of the Rus-
sellian (R-) theory. For that reason, the R-theory is immune to objections
that are based on temporal parity. I shall then offermy own interpretation
of McTaggart’s paradox that renders Ingthorsson’s version of presentism
subject to it.
Keywords: McTaggart’s Paradox, A-series, B-series, temporal parity,
Russellian (fact) ontology, substance ontology, presentism.
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1 Introduction
In his valuable book on McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthorsson (2016,
[9]) makes some provocative claims regarding the scholarship on
McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. Most notable is his
claim that the key assumption that McTaggart employs in his argument,
namely, the principle of temporal parity—the view that all times (whe-
ther A-times or B-times) exist equally or co-exist—is a basic tenet of the
B-theory and therefore, McTaggart’s paradox cannot be used to support
the B-theory. In other words, McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of
the A-series rests on a premise that also undermines the B-series, and
the B-theory of time. Ingthorsson expresses this point as follows: “But,
in the end, the central question still is, do all times exist in parity or not?
If they do [as the B view maintains], then how should we understand
such a reality as temporal? That is, wherein lies the temporality of ear-
lier than and later than?” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 141, [9]).
A further provocative claim Ingthorsson makes is that virtually all
commentators on McTaggart’s philosophy of time have failed to recog-
nize the connection between his a priori metaphysics, that is, his view
of Absolute Reality, and his view of Present Experience. Ingthorsson
maintains McTaggart’s argument for time’s unreality is intended to
demonstrate that time as it is given to us in experience, as stated in
the chapter “Time,” in (1927, [14]), is incompatible with his view of
Absolute Reality found in (1921, [13]). For that reason, Ingthorsson is
highly critical of Broad (1933, p. 9, [3]) who claims that McTaggart’s
paradox is a stand-alone argument that is not dependent on the results
in the first part of his inquiry.
Another controversial thesis of Ingthorsson’s book is that McTag-
gart is not concerned with the language of time, but the ontology of
time. McTaggart’s argument is not based on the proper semantic analy-
sis of sentences which record the facts of temporal becoming, such as “It
is raining,” and “It’s raining has been future and will be past,” but with
their ontological analysis. Ingthorsson argues that given the principles
that underlie McTaggart’s substance ontology, the ontological ground
of time as we experience it and express it in ordinary language can-
not exist, and since McTaggart believes that only what exists is real, he
concludes that time is unreal. Thus, it is a mistake to claim as Broad
(1938, p. 317 [4]), Lowe (1987, [11]) and others have done that McTag-
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gart’s argument is based on linguistic confusions.
At the outset, I would like to say that I applaud Ingthorsson’s empha-
sis on the ontology that underlies McTaggart’s argument, and given the
ontology he attributes toMcTaggart, I would not contest that he demon-
strates that time is unreal. So, I wholeheartedly agree with his emphasis
on the ontology and not the language of time. However, I shall argue
that a textual case can also be made for questioning the claim that Mc-
Taggart’s a priori metaphysics developed in (1921, [13]) is what he em-
ploys to demonstrate the unreality of time in (1927, [14]). There is an
important difference between the ontology Ingthorsson attributes toMc-
Taggart, and the ontology McTaggart employs to generate his paradox.
Indeed, the ontology presupposed by McTaggart’s argument (the doc-
trine of external relations) is inconsistent with his prior commitments.
Therefore, not only is Ingthorssonmistaken aboutMcTaggart basing his
argument on his prior ontology, I will show that McTaggart is incon-
sistent in that he bases the argument on an incompatible (Russellian)
ontology.
Furthermore, I would also question whether McTaggart’s argument
for the unreality of time shares a common assumption with Russell’s
view that McTaggart claims to be critiquing in the chapter on “Time,”
that the B-series alone constitutes time. Ingthorsson claims that just as
McTaggart’s ontology implies that all temporal positions whether past,
present or future co-exist equally even if they are not present, on the B-
theory all times co-exist equally even if they are not simultaneous, but
successive. Indeed, it is the co-existence of past, present and future that
is common to McTaggart and the B-theorists. As he puts it,
To illustrate the fundamental difference between A theorists,
on the one side, and McTaggart and the B theorists on the
other [we can say:] The former cannot understand why we
should think of the future and past as an existing reality—at
least not one separate from what exists in the present—and
thus fail to see why we should interpret claims about the
future and past as claims about something non-present and
yet existing, whereas the latter cannot understand how we
can fail to think of the future and past as co-existingwith the
present, even though they are not co-located in time.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 89, [9])
Ingthorsson’s thesis is that the only adequate A-theory is presentism,
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since it rejects temporal parity, whereas all other theories followMcTag-
gart and B-theorists in accepting temporal parity, and thereby fail. Thus,
Ingthorsson maintains that the fundamental debate is not between A-
and B-theorists, but between those who adopt the temporal parity the-
sis (McTaggart and B-theorists and others),1 and those who deny it
(presentists). I shall argue, however, that there is a third alternative
that involves a Russellian (or R-theoretic) ontology of time that differs
from presentism, McTaggart and the B-theory, as Ingthorsson under-
stands them. The debate between R-theorists and Ingthorsson’s version
of presentism is between those who view the spatio-temporal universe
as the sole purview of reality and those who view the world as greater
than the universe, including non-spatial and non-temporal objects. The
fundamental debate, in other words is between naturalists and ontolo-
gists to use terms that Reinhardt Grossmann (1992, [8]) did to distin-
guish a fundamental philosophical divide.
To explainwhat I consider to bewrongwith how Ingthorsson charac-
terizes the fundamental agreement between McTaggart and the B-theo-
rists it will be necessary to distinguish McTaggart’s understanding of B-
relations and the B-series fromaRussellian understanding of R-relations
and the R-series.2 Given the incommensurability between McTaggart
and Russell’s analyses of the “B-series” it is a mistake to believe that
the temporal parity thesis in McTaggart’s argument against the A- and
B-series can also be employed against the R-series to demonstrate that
“the conception of temporal reality as a series of events […] related as
earlier/later than each other […] is a conception of a changeless real-
ity and consequently not a conception of a temporal reality” (Ingthors-
son 2016, p. 92, [9]). I shall proceed by briefly summarizing in section
II, McTaggart’s ontology as Ingthorsson understands it, and how it dif-
fers from Russell’s ontology. Then, in section III, I will explain key ele-
ments of the Russellian or R-theory of time and the principle of temporal
parity, demonstrating how they differ. In the fourth section, I discuss
McTaggart’s paradox and showhow it not only undermines theA-series,
but that it is also applicable to presentism as Ingthorsson conceives of
it. Since his paradox can be interpreted to show that succession, con-
strued R-theoretically, is the ground of the passage of time, and since
1Ingthorsson tends to include A-B hybrids, moving spotlight theorists, and even
growing blockers among those who accept temporal parity.
2I contrast the B-theory and the R-theory below (pp. 9–11). See also, Oaklander,
2016, 2015, 2014a, 2014b and 2012 [17–21].
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presentism rejects cross-temporal relations, McTaggart’s argument un-
dermines Ingthorsson’s presentism as well.
2 McTaggart’s Substance Ontology and Russell’s
Fact Ontology
According to Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s metaphysics “is the ultimate
substance ontology and alluring in its simplicity. Reality is grounded in
the existence of substances that bear properties and stand in relations”
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 15, [9]). Regarding substance McTaggart claims:
There is a substance which contains all existent content, and
of which every other substance is a part. This substance is
called the Universe. A universe contains all existent content.
Or we can define the Universe as a substance of which all
other substances are parts.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 135, p. 148, [13])
As Ingthorsson interprets him,
McTaggart presupposes that time, if real, is a compound
whole whose every part is equally existent and real. […]
Since existence and reality coincide, and every existing thing
is in time, then by time he includes thewhole of reality. There
is no distinction to be drawn between existence, reality and
time, in terms of their constituents. […] In other words, time
cannot be external to existent reality but must be an existing part
of it.
(Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 23–24, 29, [emphasis added], [9])
McTaggart says that if any reality is in time, then it must exist. That
may be true, but it does not follow, that time itself is in time, that time
is an existent somehow in the universe; the realm of concrete objects.
Clearly, there are things in the universe that change, but time which is
necessary for change, need itself not be in the universe and it need not
change. There may be a content greater than the universe; there may be
a world that contains constituents that exist but are not in time. I shall
argue that in such a world temporal relations and temporal facts (and all
other relations and facts) exist. These relations and facts do not change
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but are what make change possible. Thus, it is a mistake to argue, as
McTaggart does, that since the relations between events in a time-series
do not change and the fact that say, an apple is green before it is red does
not change, there is no time or change, unless A-change or becoming is
introduced. To see what is involved in these points, it will be useful
to consider a distinction that Ingthorsson blurs, between the notion of
“fact” in McTaggart’s substance ontology and in Russell’s fact ontology.
On a substance ontology, the only ontological categories are substan-
ces, qualities and relations. Facts do not belong to a category of their
own, and so must be understood as being either a substance, quality or
relation. This is McTaggart’s view, according to Ingthorsson:
We need to become familiar with McTaggart’s understand-
ing not only of the general nature of the fundamental
building blocks (substances, qualities, relations), but also
of whatever has to do with the distinction and connection
between thought and reality, such as beliefs, assumptions, as-
sertions, facts, truth and falsity. With respect to the latter, one
must understand that they do not form a separate category of
entities distinct from substances, qualities, and relations.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 16 [emphasis added], [9])
On the other hand, Ingthorsson also claims that
McTaggart’s account of facts is in fact very similar to the account
given by the logical atomists of an atomic fact, notably that it
consisted “either in the possession by aparticular of a charac-
teristic, or in a relation holding between two ormore particu-
lars” (Urmson 1960: 17).
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 28, [emphasis added], [9])
Surely, these two notions of “fact” although verbally similar—both are
called “states of affairs”— are ontologically quite different.
In a fact ontology, such as logical atomism, there are particulars, non-
relational and relational universals, and facts. If a particular exemplifies
a non-relational quality, those two different kinds combine to form a fact
which is an entity over and above its constituents. It is a unity with com-
plexity. If some particular stands in a relation to another, for example,
if a is earlier than b, there is a temporal relational fact. Facts do not exist
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in time (or space), and the relational universals that are constituents in
them do not exist in time (or space) either, although the terms (partic-
ulars) of temporal relations do exist in time.
The philosophy of logical atomism and the notion of an atomic fact
is associatedwith Russell. He treats facts as a category of their own over
and above their constituents when he says,
Facts are […] plainly something you have to take account of
if you are going to give a complete account of theworld. You
cannot do that by merely enumerating the particular things
in it: youmust alsomention the relations of these things, and
their properties, and so forth, all of which are facts, so that
facts certainly belong to an account of the objective world.
… and the things and their qualities or relations are quite
clearly in some sense or other components of the facts that
have those qualities or relations.
(Russell 1918, pp. 191–192, [27])
A Russellian fact is a single (unity), yet complex entity that cannot be
reduced to its constituents, and for that reason forms a separate category
of entities distinct from substances (particulars), qualities and relations.
Despite Ingthorsson’s attributing a substance ontology to McTag-
gart and his subsequent denial of the separate category of facts, McTag-
gart seems to recognize the category of fact and, like Russell, construes
(some) facts as timeless even before his denial of the reality of time, since
he says:
When the subjective belief is eliminated, it seems to me that
the truth goes with it and that we find ourselves left, not
with a timeless, non-existent, and true proposition, but with
nothing but the fact, which is not true (though it determines
the truth of beliefs), which may or may not be timeless, and
which, as we have seen above, is always in one way or anoth-
er, existent.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 38, pp. 35–36, [13])
In the context of discussing the question of whether there are entities
that are real, but non-existent, McTaggart distinguishes substance, qua-
lity and relations categorically:
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Qualities and relations are very different from substances,
and the fact that a substance cannot be both existent and non-
existent does not prove that qualities and relations—which
are universal, and not particular as substances are—could not
be existent in one aspect, and non-existent in another. (Mc-
Taggart 1921, sect. 5, p. 6, [13])
Although McTaggart ultimately rejects the reality of qualities and rela-
tions as real, but non-existent (unexemplified) he accepts Russell’s dis-
tinction between universals and particulars. McTaggart claims “I am
aware of an object or am acquainted with an object—the phrases are
used synonymous—when ‘I have a direct cognitive relation to that
object’” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 44, p. 40, [13]). He then approvingly
quotes Russell:
When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we
are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is sense-
data. When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct ac-
quaintance with the colour or the noise. […] But in addition
to the awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be
called awareness of particulars, we have also […] what may
be called awareness of universals. And universal relations,
too, are
objects of awareness; up and down, before and after, resem-
blance, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of
which we can be aware.
(Russell 1912, pp. 209–212, [emphasis added].
In: McTaggart 1921, sect. 44, pp. 40–41, [13])
This is striking because Russell used direct acquaintance with before and
after as grounds formaintaining that they are primitive, simple temporal
relations.
Further evidence that McTaggart takes qualities and relations to be
ultimate, and indefinable, ineliminable universals and distinct from par-
ticulars is his appeal to Russell’s argument against reducing the com-
mon quality of two particulars to the simple relation of exact likeness
between them. McTaggart (1921, sect. 83, fn. 1, p. 83, [13]), cites Rus-
sell’s argument in “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” to
justify the irreducibility of qualities as universals because the argument
against qualities requires relations as (timeless) universals:
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Likeness at least, therefore, must be admitted as a universal,
and, having admitted one universal we have no longer any
reason to reject others. Thus, the whole complicated theory,
which had no motive except to avoid universals, falls to the
ground. […] There must be relations which are universals
in the sense that (a) they are concepts, not percepts; (b) they
do not exist in time; (c) they are verbs, not substantives.
(Russell 1911–12, p. 9, [24])
So, we can say that in certain respectsMcTaggart’s ontology has similari-
ties with Russell’s. There exist substances (particulars) that stand in
relations and have non-relational qualities. Qualities and relations are
universals (they do not exist in space or time) and substances are parti-
culars in that, if time exists, are the terms of temporal relations and so
exist in time. Surprisingly, then, in (1921) Russell’s influence on Mc-
Taggart is apparent in his treatment of relations, although there is also
a fundamental difference.
McTaggart claims that the conception of relations is indefinable, since
it is impossible to substitute for it any other concepts which can be taken
as equivalent (McTaggart 1921, sect. 80, p. 80, [13]). He notes that the-
ories have been put forth to demonstrate “that relation, though valid of
existence, was not ultimate, but definable in terms of quality, so that state-
ments about relations could be translated into statements about qualities”
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 80, p. 81, [emphasis added], [13]). McTaggart
maintains, however, that these theories aremistaken. “No fact which can
be stated in terms of relations between substances can ever be stated in
terms which omit the conception of relation” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 82,
pp. 82–83, [13]). In other words, McTaggart initially rejects the view that
relations can be reduced to or eliminated by the qualities of one or both
of the terms of the relation.
Although McTaggart argues that relations are indefinable, irreduci-
ble and ineliminable in terms of qualities, he does say that if there are
relations then there are qualities generated in each of the terms of the
relation. McTaggart summarizes these points in the following passage:
The conception of relation, then, must be accepted as valid
of the existent. But it might be admitted to be valid, and yet
denied to be ultimate and indefinable. It might be said that
it really was true that substances were in relations, but that
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the fact expressed in this way could be expressed in terms
of qualities only, without bringing in relations. But this also
is false. […] A relation may no doubt be based on a quality
in each of its terms. But this does not mean that it can be
reduced to those qualities. If A is larger than B, this relation
may depend on the fact that A covers a square mile, and
B covers an acre. … But a statement of the size of A and a
statement of the size of B are not equivalent to a statement
that A is larger than B, though the lattermay be a certain and
immediate conclusion from them.
(McTaggart 1921, sect. 82, pp. 82–83, [13])
It is quite clear therefore thatMcTaggart (1921, [13]) accepts the existen-
ce of relations, including temporal relations, and in his discussion of
cognition (1921, [13]), he quotes Russell who maintains that we are ac-
quainted with them.
Thus, there are three views of relations that McTaggart considers.
First, that relations are definable, reducible or eliminable in terms of
qualities; a view McTaggart consistently rejects in (1921, [13]). Sec-
ond, that relations are not definable or reducible to the qualities of their
terms but depend on them;McTaggart’s view in the passage just quoted.
Third, Russell’s view that relations are indefinable and irreducible to
qualities and are not dependent on the qualities (temporal or otherwise)
of their terms. McTaggart seems to have some sympathy with this Rus-
sellian view in his discussion of cognition quoted above. In the next sec-
tion I shall argue that McTaggart’s argument against the B-series, the
A-series, and thus against the reality of time does not depend on the
principle of temporal parity as Ingthorsson understands it, but on his
changing analysis of temporal relations. For that reason, McTaggart’s
argument in (1927, [14]) should or at least could, as Broad maintained,
be understood as a stand-alone argument that does not depend on his
a priori metaphysics in (1921, [13]).
3 The R-theory and the Principle of Temporal
Parity
Richard Gale refers to Russell as “the father of the B theory” and in-
deed, there is a good reason for him to do so, since McTaggart claims
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that “Mr. Russell’s time-series […] is identical with our B series […]
and the relation which unites the terms of the B-series is the relation of
earlier and later” (McTaggart 1927, sect. 351, p. 31, [14]). However, the
ontology of the B-series as McTaggart understands it is not the same as
the Russellian time series as it should be understood. It will be useful,
therefore to clarify Russell’s authentic view in contrast to the B-theory
which is McTaggart’s misrepresentation of Russell but has nevertheless
been accepted generally as Russellian.3 A brief discussion of some of
the differences between the Russellian theory of time (“R-theory” for
short), and standard B-theoretic accounts as understood by defenders
and critics alike is in order.
On typical interpretations, the ontology of B-time is construed as
anti-realist because it denies that temporal passage is an objective, mind-
independent feature of reality. or that reason, B-relations and the B-
facts they enter, that alone constitute the foundation of the B-theory
of time, are “nontransient” and static in that what appears to be the
flow and flux of events in time —time’s dynamism—is an illusion that
would not exist without consciousness.4 On the other hand, R-relations
as given in experience are not static, but dynamic, and are the basis of our
experience of transition and the passage of time.5 Since the R-theory re-
jects the common view that B-time is a static, block universe, this last
point deserves attention.
3For a good discussion of McTaggart’s misinterpretation of the Russellian view see
Tegtmeier (2012, [32]).
4Not all B-theorists think of B-relations as static. See, for example, Savitt (2002, [30]),
Deng (2013a, 2013b, [5–6]), Leininger (2014, [10]), and Mozersky (2015, [15]). For a
critique of those who claim that the A-series, temporal passage and the dynamic aspect
of time are illusions see Boccardi and Perelda (2017, [1]).
5Russell gives a colorful example of our experience of the earlier than relation in the
following passage: “Immediate experience provides us with two time-relations among
events: they may be simultaneous, or one may be earlier and the other later. These two
are both part of the crude data; it is not the case that only the events are given, and their
time-order, within certain limits, is a much given as the events. In any story of adven-
ture you will find such passages as the following: ‘With a cynical smile he pointed the
revolver at the breast of the dauntless youth. “At the word three I shall fire,” he said.
The words one and two had already been spoken with a cool and deliberate distinct-
ness. The word three forming on his lips. At this moments a blinding flash of lightning
rent the air.’ Here we have simultaneity—not due, as Kant would have us believe, to
the subjective mental apparatus of the dauntless youth, but given as objectively as the
revolver and the lightening. And It is equally given in immediate experience that the
words one and two come earlier than the flash’.” (Russell, 1914, pp. 116–117, [25]).
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I have the knowledge that time has passedwhen, for example, I reflect
on successive changes along my life’s way (when I got married, when
my first child was born, when my first grandchild was born and so on),
or when I see that the position of the minute hand on my watch has
changed its position. There is, however, amore immediateway inwhich
we know that time is passing. This occurs when we are directly aware of
passage, when we experience change in a single act of awareness. For
example, if we look at a second hand of a watch or a flickering flame,
we see the moving second hand at one place on the watch before the
other, or one flicker of the flame occur before another in a single act
of awareness. These are cases where we experience two stages of the
second hand or flame occur in succession, one earlier than the other,
and in so doing we are directly aware of a temporal transition or pas-
sage from one stage to the other. Similarly, when we hear the successive
notes of a tune or feel the successive taps of a physician on our abdomen
during a physical, we directly experience that time is passing.
On the R-theory, an appeal to the direct experience of succession in
a single act of awareness is the basis for grounding our most basic ex-
perience of the flow or passage of time on mind-independent temporal
earlier/later than relations alone; a view Iwill call the temporal relational
theory or Russellian theory. On the R-theory, the commonsense belief
that time passes is to be understood in terms of the relation of succes-
sion between earlier and later temporal objects. Thus, the passage of
time consists in the succession of events throughout the history of the
universe; one event – the earlier – being followed by another – the later.
Returning to the differences between B- and R-theorists, on standard
(reductionist) B-theories, B-relations are analyzable in terms of causal
relations whereas the R-theory takes R-relations as primitive and unan-
alyzable, relational universals that can be directly experienced. Russel-
lian temporal relations are external relations, since “there are such facts
as that one object has a certain relation to another, and that such facts
cannot be reduced or inferred from, a fact about the one object only to-
gether with a fact about the other object only: they do not imply that the
two objects have any complexity, or any intrinsic property distinguish-
ing them from two objects which do not have the relation in question”
(Russell 1966, pp. 139–40, [28]). For that reason, R-relations are neither
analyzable in terms of A-properties of their terms nor do they depend
on A-properties. Indeed, on the R-theory there are no such properties.
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A last difference is particularly important for the discussion to fol-
low. The B-theory is often identified with McTaggart’s (1927, [14]) mis-
interpretation of Russell, according towhich B-relations are unchanging
and B-facts are permanent in that if a is ever (at any time) earlier than b,
then a is always earlier than b. In contrast, R-theorists do not believe that
either R-relations or R-facts exist in time, much less at every time, as Mc-
Taggart’s interpretation implies. Earlier than is a timeless yet dynamic tem-
poral relation. It is timeless because it does not exist in time; as a term of
a temporal relation. It is dynamic because it is the ground of our experi-
ence of the passage of time; of successively existing temporal objects that
exist tenselessly, that is, without tensed or A-properties. Similarly, time,
understood as a Russellian series composed of a conjunction of R-facts,
is timeless or atemporal. This view gives somemeaning to an aphorism
I favor, namely, time is timeless, or eternal in just this sense: though time
contains temporal relations, time does not exemplify them.
Ingthorsson argues thatMcTaggart’s paradox rests on a premise that
can also be used to undermine the B-theory of time. The only view left
standing is presentism. The premise is the “temporal parity thesis,” the
view that all times exist equally or co-exist, in a sense that is compatible
with their being successive and not simultaneous or timeless. I disagree
and shall argue thatMcTaggart’s argument rests on a premise other than
temporal parity whose implications refutes the B-series (as McTaggart
understands it), the A-series (whose terms are past, present and future)
and theA-theory including presentism, butwhen the dust settles, leaves
the R-theory unscathed. This is a surprising conclusion, but true none-
theless, or so I shall argue.
The premise that plays a crucial role in McTaggart’s argument
against the B-series, the A-series and for the unreality of time is not the
principle of temporal parity as Ingthorsson understands it, but McTag-
gart’s analysis of “earlier than.” He states that analysis in the following
passage:
The series of past, present and future is what we have called
the A series, on which the B series of earlier and later is de-
pendent. The term P is earlier than the term Q, if it is ever past
while Q is present, or present while Q is future.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, p. 271, [emphasis added], [14])
This premise is nowhere argued for but is assumed in his argument
against the B-series and the A-series. Moreover, it is incompatible with
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his account of relations in (1921, [13]), and so incompatible with the a
priori metaphysics found there. Recall, that in (1921, [13]) he argued
that relations are indefinable, and that while the terms of relations have
qualities on which they may be based, they cannot be reduced to those
qualities. However, in a footnote accompanying the passage above, Mc-
Taggart is claiming that “earlier than” can be defined in terms of tempo-
ral qualities (or relations to a term X outside the A-series). I shall ar-
gue that this analysis is crucial to his argument for the unreality of time
but is incompatible with the temporal parity thesis, and his earlier view
of relations. For that reason, McTaggart’s (1927, [14]) argument can
be construed as a stand-alone argument not dependent on his a priori
metaphysics in (1921, [13]).
We shall see, even more importantly, McTaggart defends his anal-
ysis of earlier than by appealing to his rejection of the B-series, but his
rejection of the B-series implicitly appeals to his analysis, and so mas-
sively begs the question against an R-theoretic interpretation of the B-
series. It also implies an understanding of the temporal parity thesis
that underscores a difference between McTaggart and R-theorists, even
if McTaggart and B-theorists can be grouped together. To see what is
involved in these points, let us return to McTaggart’s text.
One problem with McTaggart’s account of “earlier than” is that the
word “while” implies that each of the disjuncts exist in time and thus
the analysis is circular. For if P is past at t1, and Q is present at t1, then
that is reducing “is past at” and “is present at” to the relations “is ear-
lier than” and “is simultaneous with.” If he denies absolute time, then
“while” would imply simultaneity. Then Socrates is past is just as real as
or is simultaneouswithOaklander is present. In that case, temporal parity
implies co-existence in the sense of simultaneity, and that is incompat-
ible with co-existing terms being successive. Finally, if “while” means
co-present or existing at the same NOW, then we still haven’t grounded
for example, Socrates existing earlier than Oaklander because Socrates
being past, and Oaklander being present are both facts that exist now.6
Leaving that problem aside, McTaggart says that there seems to be
a counterexample to his account of “earlier than” since in a durational
presentwe are acquaintedwith the earlier than relationwhere both terms
6Hope Sample has suggested to me that “while” could be understood in an atem-
poral sense of co-exist, but then co-existence would imply that each of the terms in
each disjunct exist “eternally” and not successively, raising the specter of McTaggart’s
paradox.
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are present and thus are neither past or future. His reply is instructive:
Two termsmay both be present together, although one is ear-
lier than the other. This is due to the fact that the present is
a duration, and not an indivisible point. But the statement
in the text remains an adequate definition of ”earlier than,”
for although P and Q may at one time be in the same present,
yet, before that, P is present while Q is future and after that,P
is past while Q is present.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
McTaggart’s response to the alleged counterexample is that if it is ever
the case that P is past while Q is present, or P is present while Q is fu-
ture,” then P is earlier than Q, and the antecedent is satisfied because
before P and Q are both present, P is present while Q is future, and after
they are both present P is past while Q is present. Thus, McTaggart says
that the statement in the text remains an adequate definition of “earlier
than.” However, to avoid an objection to his definition of “earlier than”
by appealing to “before” and “after” is obviously circular. We saw that
his appeal to “while” in his statement of the analysis of ‘earlier than’ is
also problematic. This is important because it shows the need for prim-
itive R-relations to account for the phenomenology and ontology of the
earlier than relation and temporal passage. Indeed, McTaggart paradox
results if we attempt to ground time without them, as we shall see.
McTaggart raises another objection to his analysis of “earlier than”
that mirrors Russell’s analysis of the tenses in “Our Experience of Time”
(1915, [26]), with which McTaggart was obviously familiar. McTaggart
says that since we can perceive the earlier than relation without percei-
ving theA-properties of pastness and futurity, perhapswe can take earlier
than as primitive (as the R-theorist would have it) and define the future
as what is later than the present, and the past as what is earlier than the
present. He says:
Since the present comprises different terms, of which any
onewill be earlier or later than any other, it might be thought
that the fact that P was earlier than Q would be perceived
when they were both present, and that “earlier than” need
not be defined in terms of the A series. After this, it might be
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thought, the future may be defined as what is later than
the present, and the past as what is earlier than the present.
Thus, the A series would be defined in terms of the B series, instead
of the B series in terms of the A series.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
In other words, McTaggart considers the view that the B-series alone
constitutes time and that the A-series is not needed in a complete ontolo-
gy of time given that we are directly acquaintedwith earlier thanwithout
being acquainted with A-properties.
McTaggart’s response is familiar since it harkens back to his argu-
ment against the B-series in his chapter on “Time” (1927, [14]). He
replies to the above argument by saying that to suppose that the B-series
alone constitutes time
[…] would be a mistake. For the series of earlier and later
is a time series. We cannot have time without change, and
the only possible change is from future to present, and from
present to past. Thus, until the terms are taken as passing
from future to present, and frompresent to past, they cannot
be taken as in time or as earlier and later; and not only the
conception of presentness, but those of pastness and futurity,
must be reached before the conceptions of earlier and later,
and not vice versa.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 610, fn. 1, p. 271,
[emphasis added], [14])
McTaggart’s argument against a B- or R-theoretic reduction of A-deter-
minations is that earlier and later are temporal relations that generate a
time-series, only if their terms formanA-series and changeA-properties
with the passage of time. His justification is the argument quoted above
that nothing changes in the B-series alone, since there is no temporal pas-
sage, and without events changing their A-determinations there are no
temporal relations. I shall show, however, that this does not constitute
an argument against the R-theory, since it mischaracterizes the R-series
as a B-series and construes the B-series in a way that assumes McTag-
gart’s definition of “earlier than.” McTaggart’s argument against the
B-series also shows that temporal parity takes the terms of the B-series
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to be simultaneous, sempiternal or timeless (eternal), and not succes-
sive, and so cannot be employed against the R-theory. To see what is in-
volved consider McTaggart’s argument against the view that there can
be a temporal series without the A-series. McTaggart argues that since
the relations between the terms of the B-series are permanent, nothing
changes on the B-series by coming into and going out of existence:
If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will always be,
and has always been, earlier than O and later than M since the
relations of earlier and later are permanent. N will always
be in the B series. And as, by our own hypothesis, a B series
by itself constitutes time, N will always have a position in a
time-series, and always has had one. That is, it always has
been an event, and always will be one, and cannot begin or
cease to be an event.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 310, p. 12, [14])
Generally, McTaggart says what he means, andmeans what he says. He
does not say that “if it is ever true that N is earlier than O and later than
M, it always will be true and always has been true that […].” He is not
talking about beliefs, but about facts, about time itself. So, the principle,
if it is ever that case that P, then it is always the case that P, is stating
a truth about the universe (the existent) that requires an ontological
ground that always exists.7
McTaggart’s argument against the B-series and for the A-series
(whether construed as terms having A-properties or standing in A-rela-
tions to a term outside the series)misinterprets the R-theory and assum-
es the existence of the A-series. McTaggart’s argument misinterprets
Russell since on the R-theory, temporal relational facts are timeless in the
sense that they do not exist in time, i.e., they do not occupy moments
(since there are none), they do not exemplify non-relational temporal
properties (since there are none), and they do not stand in temporal
relations (since relations of the first order can only have particulars as
terms). On McTaggart’s analysis of the B-series, however, B-relations
7Although Ingthorssonwould disagreewithmy literal interpretation of this passage
(see Ingthorsson, 2016, p. 39, [9]), he does say “McTaggart consistently stays in object-
language mode, assuming that he is talking about the world, and only ever takes a
step back to talk about our talk of the world when he thinks that his particular use of
words invites the risk of misunderstanding” (Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 89–90, [9]), and
that would support my interpretation.
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between terms are permanent, they always have been and always will be.
In other words, B-facts and the terms of those facts always exist; they
exist at every time. “If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will
always be, and always has been, earlier than O and later than M” (McTag-
gart 1927, sect. 310, p. 12, [emphasis added], [14]). This contradicts
the notion of R-relations and R-facts, since if R-relations and R-facts do
not exist in time then they cannot be permanent, and therefore cannot
exist at every time. Why, then, in an argument against Russell would
McTaggart assume that the B-series is permanent or always exists?
It is at this point that McTaggart’s assumption of his definition of
“earlier than” comes into play. If B-relations are analyzed in terms of dif-
ferent substances/events having incompatible A-properties at the
same time (P is presentwhileQ is future) or (P is pastwhileQ is present),
and so on, then the B-series would exist at every time. The B-series
would be a permanent fact whose terms exists at every time with differ-
ent temporal A-properties. Thus, without A-properties the series of
the terms of the B-series would not be successive but either a simulta-
neous, sempiternal block, or timeless. Admittedly, on such an interpre-
tation of the B-series nothing would change by coming into and going
out of existence or by acquiring and losing a property. However, in
an argument against R-relations, that are primitive, unanalyzable and
indefinable relations, it obviously misunderstands R-relations (or the
B-series as a Russellian would understand it) and begs the question.
McTaggart’s argument that the characteristics of pastness, present-
ness and futurity must be relations to a term outside the time series and
not qualities supports my reading of temporal parity as excluding co-
existing yet successive times:
Let us first examine the supposition that they are relations.
In that case only one term of each relation can be an event or
a moment. The other term must be something outside the
time-series. For the relations of the A series are changing
relations, and the relation of terms of the time-series to one
another do not change. Two events are exactly in the same
places in the time-series, relatively to one another, a million
years before they take place,while each of them is taking place,
and when they are a million years in the past. The same is
true of the relation of moments to each other. Again, if the
moments of time are to be distinguished as separate realities
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from the events which happen in them, the relation between
an event and a moment is unvarying. Each event is in the
same moment in the future, in the present, and in the past.
(McTaggart 1908, p. 467, [emphasis added], [13])
Thus, forMcTaggart, to say that a is earlier than bdoes not changemeans
that they are in the same position in the time series before they take place,
after they take place and when a and b are happening. However, if B-
series facts exist at every time, then their constituents, a and b, always
exist, and so are simultaneous or sempiternal, and not successive. Thus,
NOW a is earlier than b, and it always has been the case and always
will be the case that a is earlier than b. This is the ground of B-series
facts always existing, but obviously, that cannot be an argument against
the existence of the R-series without the A-series, unless it assumes an
analysis of the B-series in terms of the A-series and confuses the R-series
with the B-series.
Interestingly, some of the textual evidence that Ingthorsson gives
to support his attributing the temporal parity principle to McTaggart
implies, it seems to me, that past, present and future events do all co-
exist, but simultaneously, and not successively. McTaggart says, “Now
tomorrowsweather is existent, for existence is asmuch a predicate of the
future and past as of the present” (McTaggart 1921, sect. 6, fn. 1, p. 7,
[13]). I think it is important to note that this quote implies not only that
“Now tomorrows weather is existent,” but also that “Now yesterday’s
weather is existent,” and “Now, today’s weather is existent.” In other
words,McTaggart’s assertion of temporal parity—that past, present and
future exist equally or co-exist—does imply that all the tensed facts in a
single A-series are now, hence simultaneous, and does not support that
they exist successively.
McTaggart is not claiming that a single event is past present and fu-
ture simultaneously, but that say, Socrates is past, Oaklander is present,
and the 100th president of the US is future, are all contents in a single
A-series, and thus all exist NOW, at the same time or simultaneously.
Thus, there is no ground for the different terms of a single A-series being
successive even though they are equally real or co-existent. For McTaggart
(1927, [14]) temporal parity does not allow for all times to be co-existent
and still be successive. McTaggart’s notion of co-existence as applied
to the terms of the A-series is simultaneity or timelessness, and there-
fore the temporal parity thesis is not something that McTaggart and
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R-theorists have in common. Thus, it is a mistake to claim that for the
R-theorist “Socrates is in reality just as existent and real as we are now,”
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 83, [9]) since for the R-theorist, Socrates is past,
and Oaklander is present, are not facts that exist now because they do
not exist in time at all.
By treatingMcTaggart and B-theorists on a par in accepting the prin-
ciple of temporal parity, Ingthorsson fails to see that there is a fundamen-
tal difference between McTaggart and R-theorists. For McTaggart two
objects/facts in an A-series cannot co-exist unless they are both NOW,
and so exist at the same time. The R-theorist need not accept temporal
parity in that sense. The R-theorist does not accept that Socrates is just
as real and existent as we are now, that there is a sense in which Socrates
“still exists.”
It might be objected that if R-relations are atemporal, then that is one
notion of “permanence” and in this context to be permanent means to
exist independently of any change. Thus, McTaggart could be making
the point that the B-series does not involve change since the relations
that generate it do not change. But it is a mistake to suppose that the basis
of change must itself change; that the ground of temporality in the world must
itself be temporal in the sense of existence in time.8
4 McTaggart’s Paradox
To begin our discussion of McTaggart’s paradox9 let me call your atten-
tion to an ambiguity, already alluded to, in the notion of the A-series.
The A-series may be a single A1-series, or the A-series can be an A2-
series of A1-series. Consider the following quotewhereMcTaggart char-
acterizes an A1-series:
We must begin with the A series, rather than with past, pre-
sent, and future, as separate terms. And we must say that a
series is an A series when each of its terms has, to an entity
X outside the series, one, and only one, of three indefinable re-
lations, pastness, presentness, and futurity, which are such
8For a fuller discussion of this point including a reply to the “No change” objection
to the R-theory in the context of Ingthorsson’s critique of the B-theory, see my review of
Ingthorsson’s book (Oaklander, forthcoming 2019, [23]). For an account of emerging
and passing away consistent with the R-theory see Tegtmeier (1999, [31]).
9For my earlier account of McTaggart’s Paradox see Oaklander (2002, [16]).
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that all the terms which have the relation of presentness to
X fall between all the terms which have the relation of past-
ness to X , on the one hand, and all the terms which have the
relation of futurity to X , on the other hand.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 328, p. 20, [emphasis added], [14])
A single A-series has terms that each co-exist, and Ingthorsson claims
that co-existence is compatible with their existing in succession, but
that is incorrect since each term in a single A-series is NOW either past,
present, or future. It is correct that a, b, c exist equally, but not that they
exist in succession.
There are two reasons why a single A1-series is not a genuine tempo-
ral series whose terms exist in succession. First, because there is no
change in a single A-series because there is no term that has a prop-
erty and then loses it. Second, although his definition of “earlier than”
would suggest that a single A-series whose terms have different A-pro-
perties is a temporal series, that is not in fact the case for if P is pastwhile
Q is present, then P and Q exist at the same time either simultaneously, if
in B-time, presently, in A-time, or at t1, if time is absolute. Thus, there is
no ground for P is earlier than Q in a single A-series, for to generate a tem-
poral series that contains “real change” there must be temporal passage
and that requires a series of A-series. An A2-series of A1-series in which
each different A1-series have termswith incompatible A-properties. For
example, in one A1a-series, e is present and e′ is future, and in another
A1b-series e is past and e′ is present. Of course, an A2-series of such a
conjunction of A1 series is not yet a temporal series for unless we intro-
duce time in some way the A2-series is contradictory. What, then, is to
be done? McTaggart’s answer is startling:
When we say that the B series is a series of changes, we do
not, of course, mean that the terms change their places in the
series. If one term is ever earlier than another, it is always
earlier than that other. But the B series is a time-series, and
time involves change. And the change in the terms of the B
series is that they are successively present (passing from fu-
turity to presentness, and from presentness to pastness). It
is first an earlier term which is present, and then a later one.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 698, p. 347, [emphasis added], [14])
What is key here is that the groundof the passage of time from the future
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to the present is the relation of succession. The A2 series of A1-series is
a temporal series because the generating relation is earlier than since “it
is first an earlier term [in an A1a -series] which is present, and then a
later term (in an A1b-series) that is present.” In other words, A-theoretic
change or temporal passage presupposes succession.10 It is not sufficient for
change that one and the same event/object/time have incompatible
temporal properties, they must have them successively.
However, the appeal to succession to ground the passage of time gives
rise to either the unreality of time, due to a vicious infinite regress
if succession is analyzed A-theoretically in terms of McTaggart’s defi-
nition of “earlier than,” or the R-theory of time if succession is analyzed
R-theoretically, since thenR-relations aremore fundamental thanA-pro-
perties, and temporal passage and temporal becoming are grounded in
R-relations.
To put this point slightly differently, let’s go back to his definition:
“The term P is earlier than the termQ, if it is ever past while Q is present,
or present while Q is future” (1927, sect. 610, p. 271, [14]). Since neither
disjunct alone could ground P is earlier than Q (even if each could entail
it), the disjunction should be a conjunction. In that case, P is pastwhileQ
is present, and P is present while Q is future. If “while” is non-temporal,
then a contradiction exists since P and Q would timelessly have incom-
patible properties. On the other hand, if “while” is temporal, then it is
assuming time and so wemust ask, what more is needed to give us time
and change? McTaggart answers that question, and his answer is quite
revealing. To repeat:
And the change in their terms of the B series is that they are
successively present (passing from futurity to presentness,
and from presentness to pastness). It is first an earlier term
which is present, and then a later one.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 698, p. 347, [14])
In other words, the ground of change in the B-series is the transition
from one present to another; the transition from one A1a-series to an-
other A1b -series is that the terms of the A2-series are successively pre-
sent! However, if succession is a primitive R-relation and the basis of
temporal passage or temporal transition then McTaggart’s definition of
“earlier than” in terms of A-properties is undermined. On the other
10This point is also argued for in Boccardi [2].
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hand, if succession from one present to another is analyzed in terms of
his definition of “earlier than,” that would give rise to another third
level A3-series whose terms are a series of A2-series, with incompati-
ble A-properties, that is contradictory and static without introducing
succession and thus leading to a vicious infinite regress. Thus, with-
out R-relations and the R-series as the basis of passage, the result is a
contradiction or a vicious infinite regress, but with R-relations, the A-
series is not needed for time to pass. For that reason, the significance of
McTaggart’s argument is not that time is unreal, but that time requires
temporal passage which can only be grounded by appealing to a primi-
tive R-relation of succession.
McTaggart’s argument can also be applied to presentism. For sup-
posewe consider his definition of “earlier than” and say that only one of
the disjuncts, that is, only oneA-series exists, the one that is now. Since it
is the case that say, P is pastwhileQ is present, we can thenmaintain that
“while” designates the present time. The seemingly advantage of presen-
tism in this case is that all tensed judgments, including those about the
future and the past for example, “It will rain” and “It did snow” and
“It is now sunny,” are all grounded in the present. The single A-series
that is present. Moreover, given his definition of “earlier than,” a single
A-series presumably also grounds the existence of that relation. Impor-
tantly, there is no contradiction since no single term of an A-series has
incompatible A-properties. These are all advantages of a McTaggartian
conception of presentism.
Nevertheless, these apparent advantages for presentism come to
naught since a single (present) A-series is not sufficient to constitute
time. To have time there must be passage and for that presentism must
account for continual becoming or absolute becoming. Passage involves
a transition from the existence of one single A-series to the existence of
another single A-series. In other words, one present (a single A-series)
must go out of existence and another come into existence. However,
transition is from existence to non-existence/existence (existence of an
A1a -series to ceasing to exist of A1a and coming to exist of A1b), and
that involves succession.
In other words, a single A-series presupposes a series of A-series
since, as Richard Gale has noted:
It can easily be shown that if there is one A-series there must
be a series of A-series. Assume that the A-series consist of
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events M, N and O, which are respectively past, present and
future. A past (future) event by definition is one which was
(will be) present. Thus, if there is one A-series there is be-
coming—a series of A-series; and if the A-series is objective
then so too is becoming. (Gale, 1969, p. 190, [7])
Note, however, that McTaggart’s point is that a sequence of A-series
does not constitute a temporal sequence or series unless the generating
relation is a temporal relation. Thus, if P(Q) is ever past (present) then
at an earlier time P(Q) had to be present (future). In other words, a sin-
gleA-series is not itself a temporal series since it does not involve change.
What is needed to generate time is passage, but passage requires a suc-
cession of present A1-series or at least a succession of present times for
different A1 series to become present at. Thus, without a primitive no-
tion of earlier than a single A-series whose terms are past, present and
future, could not exist. Of course, with a primitive earlier than relation
there would not be an A-series either since a primitive earlier than re-
lation is nothing other than the R-relation which therefore must exist,
and an R-relation being an external relation does not have terms with
A-properties.
Clearly, Ingthorsson would reject this McTaggartian understanding
of presentism because he rejects A-properties (past and future events),
and “denies that tensed passage occurs at all” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 128,
[9]). Nevertheless, I think the line of argument I have developed in
interpreting McTaggart applies to his form of presentism as well. For
although Ingthorsson rejects tensed passage, he undoubtedly accepts
temporalpassage since he believes that the ordinary conception of change
is dependent on it. He says,
Change is a difference in the properties of an object that re-
mains numerically identical through the change, i.e., ‘gen-
uine change’. This conception of change requires that things
persists by enduring, i.e., that they come to exist at many
times by passing as numerically identical three-dimensional
bodies through time. […] It is the view that ordinary mate-
rial objects are three-dimensional things that move as numeri-
cal wholes through a succession of times.
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 94, [emphasis added], [9])
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Ingthorsson highlights the need for temporal passage in endurantism
when he says: “It is indeed some form of temporal passage that is sup-
posed to allow three-dimensional objects to come to exist at many times
and yet exist completely and only at each of those times., i.e. without
having parts ‘lying around’ at other times” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 95,
[emphasis added], [9]). Ingthorsson makes it clear that temporal pas-
sage is “what allows three-dimensional particulars to be at many times
in succession” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 99, [9]) and to be wholly present
at those times. His form of presentism involves “permanent” material
substances that do not come into being or go out of being, but “‘remains’
continuously in the present” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 138, [9]) as they pass
through the flow of time and change.
There are several problemswith this analysis that lead us once again,
it seems to me, to the R-theory. Ingthorssonmaintains that just as an ob-
ject canmove from one place to another only if it passes as a whole from
one place to another, an object can pass from one moment to another
only if it is wholly contained in each moment through which it passes
(Ingthorsson 2016, p. 99, [9]). The first point I want to make is that the
analogy assumes the existence of times that exist before and after a sub-
stance arrives at them, just as spatial places must exist before and after
an object leaves and arrives at them. The idea of motion assumes that
the placewherewe left from still exists and the place that we aremoving
to already exists. So, if an object, x, leaves one time, arrives at another
time, and moves toward another time, this implies that more than the
present time exists. Thus, the notion of temporal passage, as Ingthors-
son unwittingly conceives of it, involves the co-existing of times that are
either not successive (if only the present exists), but are simultaneous,
or they are successive but then it is not the case that only the present
exists and is incompatible with his denial of cross-temporal relations.
Thus, Ingthorsson is faced with a dilemma. If the passage of objects
through time is grounded in the succession of times through which ob-
jects move, then since succession is a cross-temporal relation and ev-
erything cannot be grounded in the present. Moreover, it treats the
time-series as a series through which objects move leading to all the
problems of the moving spotlight view, and further undermining pre-
sentism. Similarly, if a substance moves from one time to another time,
then those times must exist (or permanently remain in existence) for
substances to move toward and away from. If moments permanently
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remain in existence, however, then they are simultaneous and sempiter-
nal and so are not successive, unless one accepts McTaggart’s definition
of “earlier than” with the subsequent vicious infinite regress to follow.
On the other hand, if past times no longer exist and future times
do not yet exist, then the notion of passing from one time to another
makes no sense, since there are no times or a temporal series through
which an object moves. If a substance comes to exist at a certain time, it is
moving towards something that already exists “waiting” for the substance
to arrive. A substance cannot move to a time and thus come to exist at
that time unless there is something it is moving toward. The best it can do
is come into existence, through absolutely becoming, at a time that also
comes into existence. That would preserve presentism, but it would do
away with temporal passage because the notion of moving successively
from one time to another has no ground if there does not exist a temporal
series, that is, if only the present time exists.
Ingthorsson claims that if there is no passage, as on the B-theory,
then everything remains permanently at its own temporal position. But
that implies that without passage the world is a totum simul. The result
is that there are no temporal relations. However, McTaggart’s point is
that temporal passage requires succession. Both the presentist and the
R-theorist reject temporal passage as tensed property change. The Rus-
sellian rejects it because there are primitive temporal relations whose
terms do not exemplify A-properties. Ingthorsson rejects tensed proper-
ties and R-relations (cross-temporal relations) because the past and the
future do not exist but puts nothing in their place. Therefore, succession
has no ontological ground in his universe and therefore, the positions
that his substances move through are not temporal positions or times,
but spatial positions that are sempiternal or timeless positions. Certain-
ly, they are not successive.
Change for Ingthorsson is “the objective loss and acquisition of pro-
perties by an enduring portion of matter. When something changes a
qualitative state ceases to exist as another begins to exist, and never is
there a cross-time relation between two qualitative states of the same
substance existing at different times. […] Change is “one state goes out
of being while another begins to be” (Ingthorsson 2016, pp. 135–136,
[9]). However, if the time at which a qualitative state of a substance
wholly present comes to exist is simultaneous with the substances’ ar-
rival, and a qualitative state of that “same” substance ceases to exist at
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the same time as the substances’ arrival, then it is not the same substance
that loses and acquires a qualitative state. If a time comes into existence
absolutely, then everything at that time must also come into existence
absolutely. There is no temporal passage from one time to another, but
just creation ex nihilo at that time. For if there is no passage, no succes-
sion of times though which substances move, then not only the quali-
tative state, but the substance having that qualitative state, goes out of
existence and the substance that comes into existence with a qualitative
state is not the same as the substance that ceased to exist with a different
qualitative state. Thus, there is not a single substance that changes from
one present to another.
Ingthorsson claims that,
The alterations that take place are a question of qualitative
states coming into and going out of being, and they are pro-
voked by the influence exerted between different portions of
matter. Here we find presentism thoroughly embedded in
a metaphysics of material nature. And it is the most sparse
ontology I know of. (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 138, [9])
Indeed it is, or seems to be, a naturalist ontology where everything ex-
ists in space and time. This is reinforced by his claim that “The core
idea of presentism, as standardly formulated, is that the concretely ex-
isting present is meant to ground everything” (Ingthorsson 2016, p. 135,
[9]). How, then, can there be a succession of times that substances pass
through? Surely Ingthorsson cannot ground the succession of times in
a concretely existing present unless he acceptsMcTaggart’s definition of
succession that we have seen, leads to a vicious infinite regress, that is,
McTaggart’s paradox. For the R-theorist, on the other hand, in order to
“ground everything” we must recognize not only the concrete particu-
lar existent, but the abstract non-spatial and non-temporal realm. Thus,
the dispute between presentism and the R-theory is a debate between
the naturalist and the ontologist à la Grossmann.
5 Conclusion
My understanding of McTaggart’s refutation of the A-theory including
presentism, also enables us to understand the overarching point of Mc-
Taggart’s main argument for the unreality of time. After arguing for the
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existence of A-change, he claims that the obvious reply to the attribution
of incompatible A-properties/relations to events is that they have those
properties successively. What, then, we must ask “does it mean to say
that events or moments of time have A-properties successively?” His re-
ply appeals to moments of time and A-properties (has been, will be, and
is now) as he later claims in his definition of “earlier than” in section 610.
Obviously, that does not work, as he will subsequently show, since the
passage of time involves different events/times successively becoming
present. Thus, if succession is analyzed in terms of a single A1-series,
or an A2-series of A1-series, or an A3-series of A2-series, the analysis
either does not yield change, or yields a contradiction, that cannot be
removed without appealing to succession and the subsequent infinite
regress.
McTaggart summarizes his argument in the following passage:
The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and fu-
ture to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction, unless
it is specified that they have them successively. This means, as
we have seen, that they have them in relation to terms specified
as past, present, and future. These again, to avoid a like con-
tradiction, must in turn be specified as past, present, and
future. And, since this continues infinitely, the first set of
terms never escapes from contradiction at all.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 332, p. 22, [emphasis added], [14].)
We see then that his argument in 1927 does not depend on the temporal
parity as Ingthorsson understands it, or the a priorimetaphysics of 1921,
but on his analysis of succession that is not argued for but assumed. In
a footnote to the passage just quoted, McTaggart makes it clear that the
vicious infinite regress arises from the attempt to avoid the contradic-
tion in the attribution of incompatible A-characteristics to the terms in
eachA1-series by appealing to succession and then analyzing succession
in terms of incompatible A-characteristics. This passage is important
enough to quote at length:
It may be worthwhile to point out that the vicious infinite
does not arise from the impossibility of defining past, present,
and future, without using the terms in their own definitions.
On the contrary, we have admitted these terms to be indefin-
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able. It arises from the fact that the nature of the terms in-
volves a contradiction, and that the attempt to remove the
contradiction involves the employment of the terms and the
generation of a similar contradiction.
(McTaggart 1927, sect. 332, fn. 1, p. 22,
[emphasis added], [14].)
To conclude, I believe to have shown three things. First, that McTag-
gart’s argument against Russell begins by assuming his analysis of the
“earlier than” relation as stated in 1927 section 610, and he uses that
analysis in his main argument against the B-series. This has given rise
to an A-theoretic misunderstanding that distorts the R-theory. Second,
McTaggart’s analysis of “earlier than” undermines all versions of the
property and the presentist versions of the A-theory, as his argument
for the unreality of the A-series sought to demonstrate. Third, since Mc-
Taggart is clear that the passage of time and the possibility of change
requires succession, I conclude that McTaggart has shown that given his
analysis of “earlier than,” time and change are unreal. Therefore, to pre-
serve the reality of time and change, we must reject McTaggart’s anal-
ysis of “earlier than,” recognize that it presupposes a primitive notion
of succession and assert that the relation that generates change is the
simple, unanalyzable R-relation of earlier than.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Emiliano Boccardi, Silvano Miracchi, Hope Sample and
Erwin Tegtmeier for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this pa-
per.
Bibliography
[1] Boccardi, E. and Perelada, F. (2017). The Delusive Illusion of Pas-
sage. Analysis 78(3): 387–396.
[2] Boccardi, E. (2018). Turning the Tables on McTaggart. Philosophy
93(3): 1–169.
[3] Broad, C.D. (1933). Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, vol. I.
London: Cambridge at the University Press.
99
[4] Broad, C.D. (1938). Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, vol. II.
London: Cambridge at the University Press.
[5] Deng, N. (2013a). Fine’s McTaggart, Temporal Passage, and the
A-versus B-Debate. Ratio 26(1): 19–34.
[6] Deng,N. (2013b). Our experience of passage on the B-theory. Erken-
ntnis 78(4): 713–726.
[7] Gale, R.M. (1969). The Language of Time. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
[8] Grossmann, R. (1992). The Existence of the World: An Introduction to
Ontology. London: Routledge.
[9] Ingthorsson, R.D. (2016). McTaggart’s Paradox. London: Routledge.
[10] Leininger, L. (2014). On Mellor and the Future Direction of Time.
Analysis Reviews 74(1): 148–157.
[11] Lowe, E. J. (1987). The Indexical Fallacy in McTaggart’s Proof of
the Unreality of Time. Mind 96(381): 62–70.
[12] McTaggart, J.M.E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind 24(68):
457–474.
[13] McTaggart, J.M.E. (1921). The Nature of Existence, vol. I. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[14] McTaggart, J.M.E. (1927). TheNature of Existence, vol. II. C.D. Broad
(ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[15] Mozersky, M.J. (2015). Time, Language, and Ontology: The World
from the B-theoretic Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[16] Oaklander, L.N. (2002). McTaggart’s Paradox Defended. Meta-
physica 3 (1): 11–25. Reprinted in: Oaklander, L.N: The Ontology of
Time. Amherst. NY: Prometheus Books, 2004: pp. 51–62.
[17] Oaklander, L.N. (2012). A-, B- and R-theories of Time: A Debate.
In: Bardon, A. (ed.): The Future of the Philosophy of Time. New York:
Routledge: pp. 1–24.
[18] Oaklander, L.N. (2014a). Dolev’s Metaphysical Anti-Realism: A
Critique. In L. N. Oaklander (ed.): Debates in the Philosophy of Time.
New York: Bloomsbury Publishing: pp. 1–29.
[19] Oaklander, L.N. (2014b). Temporal Realism and the R-theory. In
Bonino, G., Cumpa, J. and Jesson, G. (eds.): Defending Realism:
Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. Boston: De Gruyter:
pp. 122–139.
[20] Oaklander, L.N. (2015). Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the
R-theory. Metaphysica 16(2): 253–269.
100
[21] Oaklander, L.N. (2016). Common Sense, Ontology and Time: A
Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s View of Temporal Reality.
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas 39(4): 117–156.
[22] Oaklander, L.N. (2017). The Best of Times. The Philosophers’ Maga-
zine 79(4): 44–49.
[23] Oaklander, L.N. (forthcoming, 2019). Review of R. D. Ingthorsson,
McTaggart’s Paradox. Metaphysica.
[24] Russell, B. (1911–12). On the Relation of Universals and Particu-
lars,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: pp. 1–24. In: Russell,
B. (2001). Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950. Marsh, R. (ed.).
London: Allen and Unwin, New York: Macmillan: pp. 115–124.
[25] Russell, B. (1914). Our Knowledge of the External World. London:
Allen and Unwin.
[26] Russell, B. (1915). On the Experience of Time. Monist 25: 212–33.
In: Oaklander, L.N. (ed.): (2000). The Philosophy of Time: Critical
Concepts in Philosophy, vol. I: pp. 174–187.
[27] Russell, B. (1918). Lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atom-
ism. Monist. In: Russell, B. (2001). Logic and Knowledge: Essays
1901–1950. Marsh, R. (ed.). London: Allen and Unwin, New York:
Macmillan: pp. 176–281.
[28] Russell, B. (1966). The Monistic Theory of Truth. In: Philosophical
Essays. London: George Allen Unwin Ltd: pp. 131–146
[29] Russell, B. (2001). Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950. Marsh,
R. (ed.). London: Allen and Unwin, New York: Macmillan.
[30] Savitt, S. (2002). On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage.
In Callender, C. (ed.): Time, Reality, and Experience. The Royal In-
stitute of Philosophy Supplement 50. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press: pp. 153–167.
[31] Tegtmeier, E. (1999). Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and its
Solution. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 2: 51–65.
[32] Tegtmeier, E. (2012). Error: Temporal Change. Revue Romaine de
Philosophie 56: 89–96.
[33] Urmson, J.O. (1960). Philosophical Analysis. London: OxfordUniver-
sity Press.
101
102
